This paper investigates what motivates intergenerational time and money transfers. We consider a model in which transfers may be driven not only by altruism, but also by exchange considerations. We use data from SHARE to discriminate between the two motives. We show that both if we consider money transfers from parents to children and time transfers from children to parents, the empirical evidence rejects pure altruism in favor of exchange. This result has important policy implications on the effectiveness of formal care provision as a substitute for informal care and on the impact of taxation on transfers.
Introduction
In this paper we empirically investigate what motivates individuals to transfer income and/or to provide care to family members. Altruism is often put forward as an important motive for money transfers and care provision (see e.g. Becker (1974) ). In case of altruism, a benevolent individual (say the parent) cares about the well-being of other individuals (the children). However, family relations may be driven not only by altruism or blood ties, but also by exchange considerations. A strand of the literature stemming from Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) stresses the importance of the exchange motive, focusing on the role of bequests and inter-vivos transfers as means of payment for attention and care by adult children to their elderly parents.
Understanding the motives for transfers is crucial in order to assess the possible effects of e.g. fiscal policy. The well-known "Ricardian equivalence hypothesis" critically hinges on the assumption that households are altruistic (see Barro (1974) ). Such households could neutralize the intergenerational transfer associated with government borrowing by adjusting their own private transfers. If transfers are mainly motivated by exchange, this neutrality hypothesis does not hold anymore. In the relationship between saving and Social security one should also take into account the role of motives for money transfers. Standard economic theory predicts that in a world without intergenerational links social security wealth crowds out saving. This link between social security wealth and private saving behavior is broken if households are altruistically linked. However, this is not true if the exchange motive for money transfers is important.
The remainder of the paper consists of two parts. In the first part, we extend the theoretical model of Cox (1987) which explains both transfer behavior of parents and caring decisions by children. The model captures both the altruism (i.e. the parent possibly donates a transfer to the child because she cares about the child's well-being) and the exchange motive (i.e. the child provides care to the parent in exchange of the transfer which she has received or will receive). The model yields predictions on both the decision to transfer (and to provide services) and the amount to transfer (care), conditional on transferring. In comparison with Cox (1987) , we come up with some sharper predictions on the effect of parent's and child's income on the amount of care provided by the child. In case of altruism, we find that this effect is positive whereas Cox (1987) was not able to sign this effect. 1 The second part of the paper is empirical. We use the 2004 wave of the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to assess whether money transfer and caring decisions are mainly driven by altruistic or exchange motives. Earlier empirical studies only analyze inter-vivos money transfers to assess which of the two motives is more important. As far as we know, this is the first empirical study which looks both at transfer and caring decisions. By using more information, we are able to discriminate more precisely between the altruistic and exchange motive of time and money transfers. SHARE contains information about three generations: the respondents, their parents and their children. Therefore, as regards parentschild relations, it is possible to build two different samples: the one in which we consider the respondents as parents (the "young" sample) and the one in which we consider the respondents as children (the "old" sample). We use the young sample to analyze financial transfers from parents to their children and the old sample to analyze services provided by each child to parents. We measure services by the time spent by each child helping her parents with paperwork.
Under altruism the sign on the marginal effect of child's income 2 on the transfer amount (conditional upon transferring) should be negative: altruistic parents should give more to the children who have less. However, we find a positive marginal effect. In other words we find that inter-vivos transfers (i.e., transfers between living persons) cannot solely be explained by pure altruistic motives. Exchange motives might (partly) govern intervivos transfers. In that respect our findings are qualitatively similar to the findings of e.g. Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) . However, the empirical evidence based on time transfers is even more convincing: an analysis of the data from the old sample shows that children who are worse off provide more services to their parents. This finding is fully in line with the exchange motive and certainly not with the altruistic motive.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the Cox model and spells out the deviations we propose. Section 3 presents the data and provides some descriptive statistics. The estimation results are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The theoretical model
In this paper we take the model of Cox (1987) as starting point of analysis. This model considers two individuals, say the parent and the child. The parent possibly donates a transfer to the child because she cares about the child's well-being (altruistic motive). In addition, the child provides care to the parent in exchange of the transfer which she has received. The parent's utility function is equal to:
where c p is consumption of the parent, s denotes services from the children to the parent, c k is consumption of the child. U () and V () are the utility functions of the parent and the child respectively. We assume that the parent is altruistic in the sense that she cares for the well being of the child, i.e. ∂U/∂V > 0 but she also likes to receive services from the child (∂U/∂s > 0). We consider the consumption of both the parent and the child to be normal goods. Moreover, we assume that the parent's utility function is strictly concave and that all goods are substitutes, i.e.:
We deviate from Cox (1987) by assuming that the utility of the child is first increasing in s until a thresholds and then decreasing:
Cox (1987) assumes it to be monotonically decreasing in s (Cox's model is equivalent tos = 0 in our specification). We allow for a positives because we think that children like to provide some services to their parents. We follow Cox (1987) in assuming that the child's utility falls at an increasing rate as services increases (V ss < 0) and that V cs ≤ 0, V cc < 0. The amount of services received enters the utility function of the parent as a choice variable because we assume that all the bargaining power is assigned to the parent. Note that there is no uncertainty in the model. The parent and child face the following budget and non-negativity constraints:
where E p and E k are income respectively of the parent and of the child and T denotes transfers from parent to child. In her optimization problem the parent should also take into account that the child only provides services in excess ofs if she gains from it in utility terms. Given the child's "threat point" utility level this constraint V (E k ,s) can be written as:
For the sake of simplicity, we keep the model static. However, in the empirical implementation we explicitly take into account that transfers and services occur at different stages of the life cycle: parents typically transfer when children are young and children provide services (such as help with paperwork) when parents are old.
The maximization problem can be written as follows:
subject to the constraints:
The Lagrangian is:
and the first order conditions (F.O.C.):
In appendix app:convexity, we present conditions under which the budget set is convex. In that case the parent's maximization problem has one unique solution.
Altruism
The first case we will consider is that the parent is purely altruistic in the sense that she transfers more money than what it is strictly necessary to compensate the child for her service provision. In terms of the model, this means constraint (6) is not binding, i.e. λ = 0. For the moment, we also assume interior solutions for s and T , i.e. ν T = 0 and ν s = 0. 4 Then, the first order conditions (12) and (13) can be rewritten as:
According to equation (15) transfers are used to equate the parent's marginal utility of consumption (U c ) with the child's one from the parent's viewpoint (U v V c ). Likewise, the parent's marginal utility of services (U s ) is equal to the child's marginal disutility of services from the parent's perspective (U v V s ). Notice that the optimal amount of services is greater than the thresholds (cf. equation (2)), i.e. V s < 0 in the optimum. Cox proves for transfers the following comparative statics properties of the model in the altruistic regime (see also appendix B.1):
4 The case of corner solutions will be covered in subsection 2.3.
Equation (17) says that keeping family income E p +E k constant, an increase in child's income is compensated with a dollar-for-dollar reduction in transfers. Since we have assumed that both child's and parent's consumption are normal goods, equation (17) implies that a rise in child's income (keeping parent's income constant) leads to a fall in transfers. The intuition is that an altruistic parent should give more to children who have less independently of any help received. In the altruistic regime, the parent's demand for services depends on family income, and not on the distribution of its components, i.e.:
If we assume that both the parent's and child's utility functions are additively separable (U cs = U cv = V cs = 0) then we can prove that an increase in either child's or parent's income leads to more services (see appendix B.1):
The assumption of additive separability can be relaxed in order to obtain the same result ( 
Exchange
In this subsection we again assume an interior solution for s and T , that is s >s and T > 0 (ν s = 0 and ν T = 0, cf. Lagrangian (10)). However, contrary to the previous subsection we now allow the exchange constraint (6) to be binding (λ > 0):
Equation (21) defines an implicit relationship between T and s conditional upon E k ands:
According to the implicit function theorem and given the assumptions V c > 0, V cs < 0 and V s < 0 (in optimum) 5 :
Substituting equation (21) and (22) into the Lagrangian (10) gives:
This utility function is maximized with respect to s. The first order condition is as follows:
Equation (26) 
Assuming that the parent's utility function is additively separable (U cs = U cv = U sv = 0) it holds that (see appendix B.2):
Equations (23), (27) imply that
Moreover, from equation (22) it follows that
Since we know that g s > 0, ∂s ∂E k < 0 (under additive separability of the parent's utility function) and g E k > 0 (see appendix B.2), the overall sign of ∂T ∂E k is ambiguous. 7
Corner solutions
In the previous two subsections we assumed interior solutions for transfers and services, i.e. T > 0 (ν T = 0, see equation (10)) and s >s (ν s = 0). Suppose now that the parent decides not to transfer (T = 0, ν T > 6 We do not need to make any separability assumptions to arrive at this result. is greater or lower than 1. 0). Then the model presented above implies the exchange constraint (6) (λ > 0) and s =s (ν s > 0) and vice versa. 8 Altruistic parents always make money transfers to their children. The child's decision not to provide services in excess ofs (ν s > 0) does not imply that the parent will not transfer (T = 0, ν T > 0): it might be possible that the exchange constraint (6) is not binding and the parent donates money to a child who does not provide services above the minimums. Such a regime could be relevant for pure altruistic parents (U s = 0) or very rich ones with poor children who (strongly) dislike to provide services above the threshold. Modeling the service decision is a difficult exercise from which we abstain. In this subsection we only focus on the transfer decision. Contrary to Cox (1987) , we do not consider the extreme case of pure exchange in which the parent cares about the services provided by the child but not about the well-being of the child (U v = 0). Instead we consider the transfer decision in the standard case of exchange that we have analyzed up to now, in which the parent cares about s but also about the child's utility (U v > 0):
By applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of transfers for services at the endowment point (T = 0, s =s):
Similarly, one can obtain the child's MRS of transfers for services at the endowment point:
P 0 p can be viewed as the demand price for the first unit of services and P 0 k as the supply price. Transfer will take place if P 0 p > P 0 k . The latent variable that governs the occurrence of an internal solution T > 0 is the following:
and T > 0 ⇔t > 0, T = 0 otherwise.
Notice that P 0 p depends on both E p and E k . The effects of an increase in E p and E k on the parent's demand price for services are equal to
The last expression cannot be signed. If parent's utility is additive separable in her own consumption and the child's well being (U cv = U sv = 0), then
The effect of a rise in E k on the child's supply price for services is equal to ∂P 0
. This is the result Cox (1987) reports at page 518.
Empirical implications
The predictions below only refer to the transfer (service) amounts conditional upon transferring (providing services). Both under altruism and under exchange, it holds that
Assuming strong separability and thus deviating from Cox (1987) , it must also hold that
Under altruism:
Under exchange:
∂T ∂E k is unsigned (45)
Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from the first wave of the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) that was conducted in 2004 9 . SHARE is a multi-disciplinary, cross-national survey that is representative of the population aged 50 and over. The survey took place in eleven European countries, namely Sweden (SE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), France (FR), Switzerland (CH), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), and Greece (GR). The survey contains information about the socio-economic status of the respondents, as well as information about their health conditions, and intergenerational time and money transfers. Moreover, SHARE contains information about three generations: the respondents, their parents and their children. Therefore, as regards parentchild relations, it is possible to build two different samples: the one in which we consider the respondents as parents (the "young" sample) and the one in which we consider the respondents as children (the "old" sample). The key variables in our analysis are financial transfers from parents to their children, and services provided by each child to parents. Financial transfers refer to any transfer amounting to 250 euros or more (adjusted by exchange rate and purchasing power) given by the parents to their children in the twelve months prior to the interview. We provide estimates with two measures of services. The first is the time spent by each child helping her/his parents with paperwork, such as filling out forms, settling financial or legal matters. The second is the time spent each child helping her/his parents with practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, household chores. 10 . Moreover, we do not use the frequency of contacts: in SHARE respondents are asked whether they had any type of contact with their parents and children, including visits, phone calls, e-mails and text messages. Given such a broad definition, almost all the respondents had at least some contacts. The threshold levels in equation (5) is not observed, therefore it is impossible to distinguish the choice to provide services from the choice about the amount of services. Table 2 suggests that the timing of financial transfers and services' provision are different: while inter-vivos transfers from parents to children seem to take place early in life, help with paperwork is provided by adult children to their elderly parents. For this reason we focus on the "young" sample (respondents as parents) to test the empirical implications of the model about transfers and on the "old" sample (respondents as children) to analyze services. 
Multivariate analysis
In the regression we control for a number of variables related to the characteristics of the child and the parent, such as age, gender, marital status and health, which are important determinants of intergenerational transfers. The description of the variables used in the following sections can be found in table 3.
Transfers
In each household the family respondent, who is randomly selected in SHARE, provides basic information on all living children (gender, age and proximity), whereas more detailed information relevant for this study (frequency of contact between the child and the parent, time and type of care provided to the parents, marital status and number of kids) is only asked for up to four children. When there are more than four children, the program sorts them in ascending order by minor, proximity and birth year, where minor is defined as 0 for all children aged 18 and over and 1 for all others, and then selects the first four. All the relevant information for our analysis are therefore collected on the 94,78% of the children. We use the data to construct a child-level file where the unit of observation is the child as in Angelini (2007) and Callegaro and Pasini (2008) . In SHARE we can distinguish biological and legally adopted children from step-children. The latter are excluded from our analysis, since the relation between parents and step children cannot be analyzed within the same framework.
In table 4 we estimate the decision to transfer with a probit model (column 1), and the decision about the amount to transfer with a linear regression (column 2). The regression on column (2) is estimated conditional on performing an inter-vivos transfer, i.e. it is run on the sub-sample of children who receive a positive transfer from their parents. This is coherent with the empirical implications obtained in section 2.4: the model provides testable predictions about the marginal effect of E p on the decision to transfer and on the marginal effects of both E p and E k on the amount to transfer, conditional on transferring a positive amount. We treat the dataset as a panel, where the cross sectional dimension is given by the different households, while the longitudinal one represents children within the same households, and we estimate the model with random effects. 11 This procedure allows us to control for unobserved correlated effects within the households.
Table 4 about here
We proxy E k with the number of years of education of the child (yedu-c), while E p is measured by current household income of the parent (income-p) and the maximum level of education attained by the parents (yedu-p), which is a better proxy for permanent income. E p has a positive and significant effect both on the probability to perform a transfer and on the amount to be transferred. Both results confirm the validity of the model ,and thus allows us to further test altruism versus the exchange model. Under altruism the sign on the marginal effect of variable proxying E k in column 2 should be negative and significant: altruistic parents should give more to the children who have less. On the contrary, in our estimates the coefficient is positive and strongly significant, thus rejecting pure altruism in favor of exchange.
As regards the other variables, the results confirm that elderly parents are more likely to transfer money to young children. Mothers and parents in bad health are less likely to transfer but, when they do, they do not transfer less than fathers and healthy parents. On the other hand, single parents give both less and less often. The higher the number of siblings, the lower the likelikood of receiving a monetary gift and the amount received. It is interesting to note that Sweden is the country where we observe the largest number of monetary gifts but the lowest amounts transferred, while Spain is the country with the lowest number of transfers but the largest amounts transferred.
Services
While in the young sample (respondents as parents) for each parent we have data on up to four children, in the old sample (respondents as children) for each parent we only observe one child: indeed, we do not have information about the respondent's siblings. Furthermore, for our analysis we have to select only family respondents 12 who have at least one parent still alive. For these reasons, the sample is relatively small. Table 5 reports the estimates of a two-part model for the help with paperwork received by parents from their children. The marginal effects in column (1) are obtained by a probit regression with as dependent variable a dummy which takes value 1 if the child provided any help with paperwork, while the coefficients in column (2) are estimated by a OLS regression with as dependent variable the number of days per month spent by children helping their parents with paperwork, for those who provide help. The first two variables (ISCO p and homemaker p ) measure the socio-occupational prestige of the parents and are proxies for E p , while E k is measured by the income and the number of years of education of the child. Since we interpret the model dynamically, we believe that what matters is not current income but permanent income, which is better proxied by education. The results of the OLS equation show that children who are worse off provide more services to their parents and are, therefore, consistent with exchange.
The behavior of the control variables is in general consistent with the literature. Gender seems to be a significant determinant of time transfers: daughters tend to provide more help than sons and female parents are more likely to receive it. Parents who are old or in bad health tend to receive more services from their children. However, the higher the number of siblings, the less likely that the child will provide help. As regards country dummies, while we do not observe large cross-country variations in the decision to provide services, the number of hours spent by children to help their parents with paperwork is significantly lower in Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) than in the rest of Europe. Table 6 reports the estimates for the second measure of services, i.e. help with housekeeping. Results are comparable to the first measure for services in terms of sign, significance and magnitude, therefore suggesting that results do not depend on the particular type of services we are considering. 
Conclusions
The modeling of intergenerational transfers is of central importance to tackle inequalities across or within families, heterogeneities in transmission behaviors and family relations and substitution or complementarity with other intergenerational transfers (human investment in children, social security benefits). Family relations may be driven not only by altruism or blood ties, but also by exchange considerations. In this paper we extend the standard model of transfers by Cox (1987) to derive sharper predictions on whether inter-vivos transfers of money and time are motivated by altruism or exchange considerations. We then provide empirical evidence on the relative importance of the two motives using data from the first wave of the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) on individuals aged 50 or over in eleven European countries. The dataset contains information on intergenerational transfers both in money and in kind on three generations: the respondents, their children and their parents. We document that while financial transfers from parents to children seem to take place early in life, time services are provided by adult children to their elderly parents. We show that both if we consider money transfers from parents to children and if we consider time transfers from children to parents, the empirical evidence rejects pure altruism in favor of exchange. Parents do not give more to children who have less, as predicted by altruism, and children who are worse off provide more attention to their parents. This result has important policy implications on the effectiveness of formal care provision as a substitute for informal care to their parents as well as on the impact of taxation on inter-vivos transfers. "Young" sample, respondents as parents income-p hyperbolic-sine log transformation of ppp-adjusted gross total household income of the parent; yedu-p maximum number of years of education of the parent and his/her partner(current or former); yedu-c years of education of the child; age-c age of the child; married-c dummy, 1 if the child is married or in a registered partnership; female-c dummy, 1 if the child is a woman; nchild-c number of children of the child; sibling-c number of siblings of the child; age-p age of the parent married-p dummy, 1 if the parent is married or in a registered partnership; female-p dummy, 1 if the child is a woman; badhealth-p dummy, 1 if the parent self report to be in less than good health;
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"Old" sample, respondents as children ISCO-p maximum between the International Socio-Economic Index (see Ganzeboom et al., 1992) of the parents. For people who work the ISCO code refers to their main job, for the retired it refers to the last job before retirement; homemaker-p dummy equal to 1 if both the parents are homemakers. In this case ISCO-p is equal to 0. income-c hyperbolic-sine log transformation of ppp-adjusted gross total household income of the child; yedu-c years of education of the child; age-c age of the child; married-c dummy, 1 if the child is married or in a registered partnership; female-c dummy, 1 if the child is a woman; nchild-c number of children of the child; sibling-c number of siblings of the child; age-p maximum between the age of the parents; mo-alive dummy, 1 if only the mother is still alive; fa-alive dummy, 1 if only the father is still alive; badhealth-p dummy, 1 if either the father or the mother self report to be in less than good health; Country dummies SE DK NL BE FR CH AT IT ES GR are country dummies.
The omitted country is Germany. A Convexity of the budget set
The budget set of our problem is:
where F (s, T ) is implicitly defined by
In order for the budget set to be convex, we need F (as function of s) to be convex, i.e. the second derivative of F with respect to s must be positive. For the implicit function theorem:
where F decreases as long as s <s and then increases, and has a minimum ins, at which it takes value 0 (see Figure A) . 
Therefore, a sufficient condition for the convexity of the budget set is that
for each s ≥ 0, with T given by (46). Given the validity of our assumptions V s < 0, V cs ≤ 0, V c > 0 and V ss < 0 (see main text), condition (48) is satisfied.
B Signing first order conditions B.1 Altruism
Total differentiation of (15) and (16) yields:
where
Like Cox we assume that the determinant |G| = AD−BC > 0 (CHECK!!!!).
Notice that E and F can be rewritten as follows:
B.1.1 ds
By substituting (52) and (53) into (51), we obtain:
This equation implies
Can we sign
If we make the assumption of strong separability of the parent utility function (U cv = 0, U cs = 0, U sv = 0), then C = U vv V c V s . 14 Moreover, the last term of the right hand side of equation (54) (A(U cs + U cv V s )) becomes zero. Therefore, we need to sign:
Note that if V s first increases with s and then decreases, the two derivatives will be negative for small values of s and positive for large values of s. Nevertheless by (16) at the optimum V s < 0, thus the sign of the two derivatives is unambiguous.
14 On page 542 and 543, Cox (1987) assumes the following sign configuration: Ucs > 0, Vcs > 0, Vcs < 0, Ucv > 0, Usv > 0, then one cannot sign ∂s ∂E k . However, consider utility function (1) and assume that U * cps > 0 and U * c k s > 0. Then it can be shown that
Then we can rewrite equation (54) ∂s
here E1 = Ucc − UvcVc. Given the sign configuration presented above, it can be easily shown that E1 < 0 and A − E1 < 0. Consequently,
By substituting (52) and (53) into (50), we obtain:
Let us define
We then have:
that proves:
Since consumption is a normal good:
The last step is to sign
Under the assumption of strong separability of the parent utility function, all the cross derivatives are equal to zero and the numerator in (55) becomes:
U cc U ss + U vv V 2 s + U v V ss where U cc < 0, U ss < 0, U vv < 0, V 2 s > 0, U v > 0, V ss < 0. This implies that:
∂T ∂E p > 0 which together with (57) and (56) gives:
B.2 Exchange
For the derivation of the comparative statics results we take equations (21), (22), (23), (24) and (26) as starting point of analysis. From these equations it follows that
• g E k = − ∂V (E k +T,s)/∂c−∂V (E k ,s)/∂c ∂V (E k +T,s)/∂c > 0.
• g sE k = − ∂ 2 V (E k +T,s)/∂c∂s−∂ 2 V (E k ,s)/∂c∂s ∂V (E k +T,s)/∂c + (∂V (E k +T,s)/∂c−∂V (E k ,s)/∂c)∂ 2 V (E k +T,s)/(∂c∂s (∂V (E k +T,s)/∂c) 2 . If the child's utility function is additive separable (V cs = 0) then g sE k = 0.
• F s = ∂F ∂s = (U cc g s − U cs )g s − U c g ss − U sc g s + U ss < 0
Given additive separability of the parent's and child's utility function, the expression above simplifies to 
C Additional estimation results

